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COMMENTS
KENTUCKY'S STANDARD FOR INEFFECTIVE
COUNSEL: A FARCE AND A MOCKERY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The sixth amendment to the Constitution provides that
the accused in a criminal prosecution "shall enjoy the right
... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The
Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama' imposed the additional
requirement that this counsel be "effective." '2 The Court's
mandate of "effective" counsel has generated a diversity of
claims to the appellate courts which have been "limited only
by the ingenuity of convicts and their post-trial counsel. De-
fense counsel's actions from the earliest stages to the bitter end
have been assailed. . . .", Despite the variety and frequency
of ineffective counsel claims,4 courts have faced the issue only
with reluctance, often rejecting such claims with the "sweeping
statement that counsel's assistance is constitutionally inade-
quate only when it is so deficient as to make the trial a 'farce
and a mockery of justice.' ,,5
Until recently, the "farce and mockery of justice" stan-
1 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
2 Id. at 71. See also Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Hawk v. Olson, 326
U.S. 271, 274(1945); Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1962). But see
Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958)
for a restrictive interpretation of "effective."
Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-
Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. Rav. 289, 302 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Waltz]. For a discussion of specific claims, see Finer, Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel, 58 CoRNLL L. Rav. 1077, 1081-116 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Finer];
Waltz, supra at 302; Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant,
78 HARv. L. REv. 1434, 1438-47 (1965); Note, The Right to Effective Counsel in Crimi-
nal Cases, 18 VAND. L. Rav. 1920, 1923-32 (1965).
' Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 14 S.D.L. Rav. 287, 288 (1969). See
Waltz, supra note 3, at 290.
3 Note, 78 HARV. L. Rav., supra note 3, at 1434. See, e.g., United States v. Reincke,
341 F.2d 977, 982 (2d Cir. 1965); Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683, 685 (4th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889 (1963). For a review of state and federal decisions both
before and after Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which extended the right
to counsel to defendants in state courts charged with serious crimes, see Note, Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L. lav. 1531 (1963).
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dard was utilized by both the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals'
and the Kentucky Court of Appeals, 7 each of which also re-
quired that in order to be constitutionally deficient the defense
attorney's acts or omissions had to "shock the conscience of the
court."' This congruity in constitutional standards exists no
more, for in Beasley v. United States9 the Sixth Circuit aban-
doned its "farce and mockery of justice" standard in favor of
the more liberal standard that counsel must be reasonably
likely to render, and render reasonably effective assistance.10 In
a subsequent decision the Sixth Circuit recognized the conflict
in standards produced by Beasley and criticized the Kentucky
Court's use of the farce and mockery standard, stating it "em-
ployed the now rejected standard."'" The purposes of this com-
ment are (1) to discuss the various policies considered and
utilized by the courts in establishing the farce and mockery
standard for effective counsel; (2) to review the Beasley deci-
sion with emphasis on the new standard adopted; and (3) to
review the farce and mockery standard as applied by the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals and demonstrate that the adoption of
a new standard should be considered by the Court.
II. THE FARCE AND MOCKERY STANDARD:
ITS SOURCE AND JUSTIFICATION
The farce and mockery standard apparently originated in
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. In Diggs v.
Welch,' 2 that court was faced with an appeal from the denial
of a writ of habeas corpus in which the defendant, Cecil Diggs,
alleged that his court-appointed counsel had given him "such
bad advice through negligence or ignorance" that he had been
denied "effective or competent counsel.' 3 In answer to this
claim, the D.C. Circuit first declared that the sixth amend-
ment protection was unavailable to this defendant because
I Stidham v. Wingo, 482 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1973).
7 Berry v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 741 (Ky. 1973).
8 Matthews v. Wingo, 474 F.2d 1266, 1268 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 985
(1973); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1970).
1 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
,C Id. at 696.
" Berry v. Cowan, 497 F.2d 1274 (6th Cir. 1974).
I 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
11 Id. at 668.
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"the [trial] court appointed a reputable member of the bar in
whom it had confidence," 4 and ". . . once competent counsel
is appointed his subsequent negligence does not deprive the
accused of any right under the Sixth Amendment."' 5 On the
basis of this reasoning, the court concluded that the petitioner
could obtain relief only if he had been denied his right to a fair
trial under the fifth amendment." The court determined that
in order to justify relief "an extreme case must be disclosed,' ' 7
and formulated the following standard: "It must be shown that
the proceedings were a farce and a mockery of justice.' 8 The
appeal of Cecil Diggs was denied, and the standard developed
has since been adopted by numerous jurisdictions, to the ex-
tent that it is now the prevailing standard for effective assis-
tance of counsel. 0
"Id.
IS Id. This conclusion was based on the court's limited interpretation of the man-
date of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), that counsel be "effective." The court
reasoned:
We are aware that if the word [effective] be construed in a broad and liberal
sense it would follow that. . . the court would have to review the entire trial
and consider all the alleged mistakes . . . .To allow a prisoner to try the
issue of the effectiveness of his counsel under a liberal definition of that
phrase is to give every convict the privilege of opening a Pandora's box of
accusations which trial courts near large penal institutions would be com-
pelled to hear.
148 F.2d at 669-70. This interpretation of "effective" counsel was still held by this
circuit thirteen years later. See Judge Prettyman's analysis in Mitchell v. United
States, 259 F.2d 787, 789-90 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958); seegenerally
Waltz, supra note 3, at 293-95.
'1 148 F.2d at 669.
17 Id.
"1 Id. It is noteworthy that this standard has now been abandoned by the District
of Columbia Circuit. See Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Bruce
v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In Scott the court said:
That [farce and mockery] standard is no longer valid as such but exists in
the law only as a metaphor that the defendant has a heavy burden to show
requisite unfairness. . . .[It] derives from some older doctrine on the con-
tent of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. What is involved here
is the Sixth Amendment.
427 F.2d at 610 (citations omitted).
" 148 F.2d at 670.
2 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Walker v. Henderson, 492 F.2d 1311 (2d Cir.
1974); United States v. Martin, 489 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1973); Garton v. Swenson, 367
F. Supp. 1355 (W.D. Mo. 1973), modified, 497 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1974); Bonaparte v.
Smith, 362 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd, 484 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1973); Donnelly v.
State, 516 P.2d 396 (Alas. 1973); State v. Swingle, 514 P.2d 1254 (Ariz. 1973); Abbott
v. State, 508 S.W.2d 733 (Ark. 1974); Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 768 (Ky.
19751
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There are several reasons why the farce and mockery stan-
dard has survived and indeed flourished. Some of the explana-
tions which have been advanced are: (1) a more liberal stan-
dard would encourage frivolous appeals and other post-
conviction proceedings;2' (2) a lesser standard would encourage
defense attorneys to intentionally lower their performance in
order to invalidate a conviction;2 (3) appellate courts are reluc-
tant to reverse, for to do so would be an implied censure of the
trial court;" (4) appellate courts hesitate to criticize appointed
counsel," fearing that in the future they would be even more
reluctant to accept court assignments;2s and (5) "the be-
lief-rarely articulated, but, I am afraid, widely held-that
most criminal defendants are guilty anyway."2 There are other
reasons perhaps, but in any event, it is safe to say that there
has been, and is, a general reluctance on the part of appellate
courts to recognize the problem of ineffective defense counsel
at trial.
Judicial reluctance to consider the problem of ineffective
counsel has manifested itself not only in the strict farce and
mockery standard, but also in two interrelated theories which
1974); State v. O'Neill, 216 N.W.2d 822 (Minn. 1974); State v. Williams, 213 N.W.2d
727 (Neb. 1974).
1 See Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889
(1945), where the court stated: "To allow a prisoner to try the issue of the effectiveness
of his counsel under a liberal definition of that phrase is to give every convict the
privilege of opening a Pandora's box of accusations which trial courts near large penal
institutions would be compelled to hear."
" See Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1390, 1401 (1960); People v. De Simone, 138 N.E.2d
556, 561 (I1. 1956) (government charged that counsel's incompetency was a "desperate
gamble," intending to reduce the trial to a farce). But see Bines, Remedying Ineffective
Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. Rv.
927, 940 n.67 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bines] ("Surely concern that some lawyers
will specialize in throwing cases is overdone. . . .The deliberate perversion of the trial
process is grounds for disbarment."). For the likelihood of disciplinary action, see
Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. Rav. 1, 17 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Bazelon]; Note, 78 HARv. L. Rav. supra note 3, at 1451.
" See Note, 49 VA. L. Rav., supra note 5, at 1540. See, e.g., United States ex rel
Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948); State v. Dreher, 38 S.W. 567 (Mo. 1897).
24 See Bazelon, supra note 22, at 25; United States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964) (counsel referred to as Mr. Z).
25 See Gray v. United States, 299 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1962). "The charge of ineffec-
tive assistance is so often leveled at appointed counsel by convicted defendants that
many lawyers dislike to accept assignments in behalf of indigents." Id. at 468.
26 Bazelon, supra note 22, at 26.
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courts have used to avoid the constitutional claim altogether.
These theories have as their basis the assumption that unless
the court was directly responsible for the defense attorney's
inadequacy, the defendant may not later claim that his right
to effective assistance of counsel was denied.
The first theory is borrowed from the commercial law con-
cept of agency. Under the agency theory, if the allegedly inef-
fective attorney was not appointed by the court, but was in-
stead privately retained by the defendant, any negligence by
the agent-attorney is imputed to the principal-defendant." In
effect, this concept says to the defendant: "You retained the
counsel, so you are estopped from claiming that his inadequacy
violated your constitutional rights." The only exception to this
theory is that if the defendant served notice to the trial court
that he was dissatisfied with his counsel, the negligence of the
attorney is not to be imputed to the defendant. 2 In such a case,
the failure of the trial court to appoint satisfactory counsel or
to allow the defendant to obtain new counsel requires the ap-
pellate court to determine if the assistance of the attorney was,
in fact, constitutionally inadequate.
The agency theory has been criticized on two grounds.
First, it has been argued that because agency is "essentially a
creature of commercial law," forcing it into the attorney-client
relationship removes its logical underpinnings. 29 The basis for
this argument is that the commercial "principal" is normally
able to inform and instruct his "agent," whereas the typical
criminal defendant is unfamiliar with the criminal law and
often incarcerated. He is, therefore, unable to intelligently aid,
direct or supervise his defense."0 The second criticism is that it
is difficult to perceive why the mere fact that a defendant has
enough wealth to employ counsel should deprive him of the
constitutional safeguard afforded his indigent brother. 1 The
" United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 426 (3rd Cir.) (concurring
opinion), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953). See also Waltz, supra note 3, at 296-97;
Note, 49 VA. L. REv., supra note 5, at 1532-33.
n United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 426 (3rd Cir.) (concurring
opinion), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953); Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1944). See also Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1390, 1405-06.
Waltz, supra note 3, at 297.
3 Id.
3 Comment, Incompetency of Counsel, 25 BAYLoR L. REv. 299, 311 (1973). See
Note, 49 VIA. L. Rzv., supra note 5, at 1535.
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distinction that the right to effective counsel is involved only
when the counsel was appointed by the court (so that the court
is therefore partly responsible for the inadequacy) seems insuf-
ficient to support the denial of constitutional protection. The
essence of both of these attacks on the agency theory is that "it
makes little sense, and even less justice, to allow imputation
of the [defense counsel's] errors to the accused to defeathis
opportunity for relief."3"
The second theory relied upon by many courts to avoid
addressing the ineffective counsel issue rests on the premise
that unless "state action" is involved, there can be no denial
of constitutional rights.3 The distinction made here is that the
state is responsible for the performance of attorneys appointed
by the court; but it is not responsible for the conduct of pri-
vately retained counsel unless the defendant complains about
his representation to the court,34 or unless the counsel's incom-
petence is so extreme that the trial court comes under a duty
to intervene and fails to do so.3 This theory differs from the
"agency" theory in that it places on the trial court an affirma-
tive duty to recognize and to eliminate any prejudicial incom-
petence by a defense counsel whether or not counsel was ap-
pointed by the court. The basis for this theory can be found in
Hudspeth v. McDonald," where the court found "a vast differ-
ence between lacking the effective assistance of competent
counsel and being denied the right to have the effective assis-
tance of competent counsel. '37
u Comment, 25 BAYLOR L. Rzv.,supra note 31, at 311.
"United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 426 (3rd Cir.) (concurring
opinion), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953); Polsgrove v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d
776, 778 (Ky. 1969); People v. Hernandez, 170 N.E.2d 673, 675, 207 N.Y.S.2d 668, 670
(1960). See Waltz, supra note 3, at 298.
3 Mandell v. People, 231 P. 199 (Colo. 1924); Sayre v. Commonwealth, 238 S.W.
737 (Ky. 1922).
"United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 426-27 (3rd Cir.) (concur-
ring opinion), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953); see Note, 78 HARv. L. REv., supra note
3, at 1437-38.
120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir.), .cert. denied, 314 U.S. 617 (1941).
31 Id. at 968 (emphasis added). The state action theory was carried to its ultimate
heights (or possibly depths) in United States ex rel. Wilkins v. Banmiller, 205 F.Supp.
123 (E.D. Pa. 1962). In a habeas corpus proceeding the relator alleged that his defense
counsel misrepresented to him that he had investigated the case and found sufficient
evidence to convict the defendant. The attorney further misrepresented to the defen-
dant that he had made a deal with the state wherein a light sentence would be provided
[Vol. 63
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Like the agency theory, the state action theory has been
the object of criticism. It has been argued that because lawyers
are essential to the American system of justice, licensed by the
state, and subject to the discipline of the courts, the incompe-
tence of an attorney representing a criminal defendant is suffi-
cient state involvement to bring the constitutional safeguards
into play." Critics have also asserted that the action of the
court in convicting and sentencing under circumstances of inef-
fective representation is sufficient to constitute "state ac-
tion."39 Finally, it has been contended that the distinction
made in Hudspeth misses the point because it is not the denial
of effective counsel that violates the defendant's constitutional
rights, but rather the denial of a fair trial that is constitution-
ally repugnant. 0
The criticisms of the agency and state action theories have
convinced some courts that the distinction between retained
and appointed counsel should be abandoned. Several have now
eliminated status of counsel or state involvement as convenient
nails upon which to hang a defendant's constitutional claim,
and instead address the effectiveness issue raised on the ap-
peal."
in return for a guilty plea. The defendant did enter a guilty plea and a life sentence
was imposed. In denying the writ the court said: "As we view this case, the significant
fact is the deliberate misrepresentation by the attorney of the prospective testimony
of certain witnesses. But the due process standard is solely whether or not the state
played any part in the wrong done the accused." Id. at 127. The court later declared
that the "trial may not have been a completely 'fair' one in the conceptualistic sense.
However, intervention by this court requires that the denial of relator's rights be the
doing of the state." Id. at 128 (footnote omitted).
Comment, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. supra note 31, at 311-12.
See Waltz, supra note 3, at 299. If the state convicts a defendant and sentences
him to death in the electric chair after a denial of due process, "there may be much
as 2,300 volts of state action." Id.
40 See Note, 78 HARv. L. Rav., supra note 3, at 1437. This argument swings away
from the sixth amendment right to effective counsel and focuses instead on the right
to a fair trial under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The rights of the
fifth and sixth amendments were often seen as overlapping by the early courts. This
approach is evidenced in Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
1' See, e.g., Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1962) (express); Craig
v. United States, 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1954) (express); United States ex rel. Hall v.
Ragan, 60 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. El. 1945) (implied); Evans v. Warden, 257 A.2d 474 (Md.
1969).
1975]
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III. THE NEW STANDARD FOR EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Until recently, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was one
of the many courts which applied the farce and mockery of
justice standard in appraising claims of ineffective counsel. In
Scott v. United States, 2 the court had stated: "Only if it can
be said that what was or was not done by the defendant's
attorney for his client made the proceedings a farce and a
mockery of justice, shocking to the conscience of the Court, can
a charge of inadequate legal representation prevail. 4 3 This
standard was often reaffirmed by the court,44 but in Beasley v.
United States45 the Sixth Circuit was presented with conduct
by a defense attorney that required it to re-evaluate, and ulti-
mately to discard, the standard expressed in Scott.
Millard Robert Beasley had been convicted of attempted
armed robbery and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. After
an unsuccessful appeal,4" he filed a motion to vacate the sen-
tence and judgment in federal district court, alleging that the
incompetence of his counsel during trial violated his sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The district
court found that although the defendant had been afforded
"incompetent and ineffective representation," he had not been
denied his sixth amendment right because the attorney's per-
formance had not rendered the trial a "farce and a mockery,
shocking to the Court."47 In evaluating the attorney's perform-
ance, the district court made a number of findings. First, the
defense counsel was incompetent in calling as the only defense
witness an antagonistic F.B.I. agent whose testimony sup-
ported the defendant's guilt and criticized his character, and
whose appearance allowed the state to introduce evidence of
past criminality of the defendant. Second, the court found fur-
ther incompetence in that counsel advised the defendant to
42 334 F.2d 72 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 842 (1964).
11 Id. at 73.
4" See, e.g., Stidham v. Wingo, 482 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1973); Matthews v. Wingo,
474 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 985 (1973); Hayes v. Russell, 405 F.2d
859 (6th Cir. 1969).
0 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
" United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1971).
11 Beasley v. United States, Opinion and Order, Civil No. 37703 (E.D. Mich., filed
Jan. 26, 1973) (quoted in 491 F.2d at 689).
[Vol. 63
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waive a jury trial while knowing that the trial judge had read
a damaging F.B.I. report which could not have been introduced
at trial. Third, the state's fingerprint evidence went unchal-
lenged even though the evidence was subject to attack on two
grounds. The defense counsel not only failed to call a witness
who could have rebutted the evidence, but he also failed to
request an independent fingerprint test, made available by the
court, which if taken would have revealed a defect in the state's
evidence. Fourth, counsel failed to call several res gestae wit-
nesses who could have testified that they were unable to iden-
tify the attempted robber. Fifth, the defense counsel was ill
and suffering pain during the trial. Sixth, investigation by the
defense counsel was only cursory and consequently the defen-
dant's only alibi witness died before being contacted by coun-
sel.48
Faced with these findings, the Sixth Circuit framed its
issue: "[T]he question we are faced with is how ineffective
and incompetent an attorney's representation of a criminal de-
fendant must be before an accused's Sixth Amendment right
is violated."49 In addressing the question, the court evaluated
its previous standard: "The phrase 'farce and mockery' has no
obvious intrinsic meaning. What may appear to be a 'farce' to
one court may seem a humdrum proceeding to another ....
The law demands objective explanation, so as to ensure the
even dispensation of justice."5
To aid in establishing an objective standard, the court
reviewed past Supreme Court holdings' and concluded "that
the 'farce and mockery' test should be abandoned as a mean-
ingful standard for testing Sixth Amendment claims."" The
court then adopted a new standard which appears to combine
the subjective reasonableness standard developed by the Fifth
" 491 F.2d at 690-91.
"Id. at 690.
Id. at 692.
" The court discussed, in chronological order: Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932) (right to counsel interpreted to mean "effective"); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S.
444 (1940) (mere formal appointment not enough); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60 (1942) (inadequate counsel renders conviction void);White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760
(1945) (effective assistance is a requirement of due process); McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) ("defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent
counsel").
11 491 F.2d at 693.
1975]
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Circuit, 3 with more objective guidelines urged by commenta-
tors54 and relied on by several courts. 5 The court declared: "We
hold that the assistance of counsel required under the Sixth
Amendment is counsel reasonably likely to render and render-
ing reasonably effective assistance."5 To provide objectivity,
the court added:
Defense counsel must perform at least as well as a lawyer
with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law and must
conscientiously protect his client's interests undeflected by
conflicting considerations. Defense counsel must investigate
all apparently substantial defenses available to the defen-
dant and must assert them in a timely and proper manner.
The court then offered this guideline for application of the new
standard: "If, however, action that appears erroneous from
hindsight was taken for reasons that would appear sound to a
competent criminal attorney, the assistance of counsel has not
been constitutionally defective.""
The new standard of the Sixth Circuit, though untested by
time, appears to be a reasonable reconciliation between the
practical problem of frivolous appeals on the one hand and the
constitutional problem of the ineffectively represented defen-
dant on the other. Its adoption raises the question of whether
the farce and mockery of justice test should remain as the
standard in Kentucky.
IV. RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL IN KENTUCKY
The right to counsel for criminal defendants in felony cases
was recognized in Kentucky long before the Supreme Court's
-1 See West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026, 1033 (5th Cir. 1973) ("counsel reasonably
likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance"); see also Herring v.
Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974) (ineffective counsel may occur even when no farce
or mockery has occurred).
See Note, 78 HRv. L. Rav., supra note 3, at 1435.
" See Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849
(1968) ("Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to
determine if matters of defense can be developed . . ."); State v. Thomas, 203
S.E.2d 445, 461 (W. Va. 1974) (Test is whether counsel's performance "exhibited the
normal and customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are reasonably knowl-
edgeable of criminal law.").
" 491 F.2d at 696.
'7 Id. (citations omitted).
" 491 F.2d at 696; see Finer, supra note 3, at 1080.
[Vol. 63
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mandate in Gideon v. Wainwright.5 1 Section 11 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the
accused has the right to be heard by himself and counsel
. ...", and the Kentucky Court has long held that in a crimi-
nal prosecution the "court may appoint counsel for [the defen-
dant], and must do so, where a felony is charged, if he fails to
select one of his own choosing.""0 The value of this right and
the necessity that counsel be "effective," were expressed by the
Court in Powell v. Commonwealth:6
This right of counsel throughout the trial is firmly rooted in
our criminal jurisprudence. It is cherished as one of the most
important safeguards against an unfair trial. Like the right
of the defendant to be present himself, his right to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel is a requirement of our Bill of
Rights, § 11, Ky. Const., and the presence of both is a condi-
tion of due process of law assured by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution."2
Given this statement by the Court, the question naturally
arises as to whether the Court has applied this concept to the
claims of ineffective counsel asserted by convicted defendants.
Claims of ineffective counsel were infrequent before the
right to counsel was underscored by Gideon. One very early
claim was presented in Vowells v. Commonwealth,3 but the
Court held: "The fact that the defendant's attorney was, in the
opinion of some of the spectators, not well enough to try the
case did not authorize a new trial." 4 Another early claim of
ineffective counsel occurred in O'Brien v. Commonwealth, 5
where the defendant alleged that his counsel, employed by his
mother, was so intoxicated during the trial that he was denied
a fair trial;"6 and that it was "the duty of the court to see that
31 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (the right to counsel is fundamental and is obligatory upon
the states by the fourteenth amendment).
" O'Brien v. Commonwealth, 74 S.W. 666, 669 (Ky. 1903). See also Ky. R. CRnM.
P. 8.04 (If a defendant is unable to obtain counsel, "the court shall, before his arraign-
ment, appoint counsel to represent him in all future stages of the proceeding, including
appeal, unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel.").
" 346 S.W.2d 731 (Ky. 1961).
"Id. at 734.
" 15 Ky. L. Rptr. 574 (1894).
"Id.
"74 S.W. 666 (Ky. 1903).
, Brief for Appellant, O'Brien v. Commonwealth, 115 Ky. 608, 610 (1903). The
1975]
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no one, especially a minor of tender age, shall be subjected to
the death penalty without being represented by counsel capa-
ble of so presenting his case to the court and jury as to give him
a fair and impartial trial." 7 In rejecting the defendant's argu-
ments, the Court primarily relied on the principle that it was
without power to review on appeal an allegation that had not
been raised in the lower court.6" It also noted, however, that the
attorney was retained, that at trial the defendant did not object
to his representation, and that there was nothing in the record
to indicate malfeasance by defense counsel.69 Thus it is clear
from the opinion that the agency principle discussed above
influenced the Court's decision.
In 1922, the Court again had the issue of ineffective coun-
sel before it, and this time it expressly relied on the agency
theory for its decision. In Sayre v. Commonwealth,70 the Court
conceded that "[ihere are many other things in the record
which indicate that counsel for appellant at the trial repre-
sented him very unskillfully. Indeed, we are persuaded that
appellant's defense would have been as well presented had he
had no attorney at all."7 The Court avoided the constitutional
issue, however, by applying the agency theory: "The general
rule seems to be that negligence, unskillfulness, or incompe-
tency of counsel is imputed to the client, and the client is
bound thereby, because the act of the counsel is the act of the
client." 7
2
The issue of the right to effective counsel remained rela-
tively dormant in Kentucky until 1963, when the Court
adopted the "farce and mockery" standard in the case of Rice
v. Davis. 73 The defendant in that case had been convicted of
state conceded that final arguments had to be postponed one day "to enable counsel
to get into proper condition to present his argument to the jury." Id. at 611.
17 Brief for Appellant, O'Brien v. Commonwealth, 115 Ky. 608, 610 (1903).
74 S.W. at 669.
' Id. For cases where intoxication of defense counsel was ground for reversal, see
Franklin v. State, 471 S.W.2d 760 (Ark. 1971); North Dakota v. Keller, 223 N.W. 698
(N.D. 1929).
70 238 S.W. 737 (Ky. 1922).
11 Id. at 738.
n Id. at 739. In candor, it should be noted that one act of unskillfulness, i.e.,
putting on a false defense, was known and acquiesced in by the defendant. Agency is
therefore more applicable. See also Payne v. Commonwealth, 79 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1935)
(perjury on advice of counsel is not a ground for reversal).
73 366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1963).
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shooting and wounding with intent to kill and sentenced to 20
years in prison. He filed a writ of habeas corpus, the denial of
which was appealed to the Court of Appeals. The defendant
alleged several irregularities in support of his contention that
his constitutional rights had been violated, but these allega-
tions could not be verified because there was no transcript
made at the trial. The defendant asserted that he had re-
quested his employed counsel to obtain a court reporter, that,
after his attorney failed to do so, he had asked the trial court
to either furnish a court reporter or allow him time to secure
one, and that this request had been denied. The Court found
that the defendant had, indeed, been denied effective assis-
tance of counsel and ordered a new trial.
Effective representation by counsel, in order to satisfy the
accused's constitutional rights to a fair trial, is a rule of law
that has been strictly construed. It must mean representation
so lacking in competence that it becomes the duty of the
court to observe such a condition and correct it. Allegations
of serious mistakes on the part of an attorney, standing alone,
even where harm results, are not a ground for habeas corpus.
In all the cases decided on this subject, the circumstances
surrounding the trial must be such as to shock the conscience
of the court and make the proceeding a farce and a mockery
of justice. 4
11 Id. at 156-57. The Court addressed the theory of agency, but added more confu-
sion than clarity to the theory's role in claims of ineffective counsel. On the one hand,
it quoted with approval Berry v. Gray, 155 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Ky. 1957): "'It is
immaterial whether such counsel was appointed by the Court or selected by the ac-
cused . . . . The prejudice to a defendant from the failure to have the effective assis-
tance of counsel results whether counsel is court appointed or selected by the ac-
cused.'" 366 S.W.2d at 156. On the other hand, the Court stated unequivocally that
"the lack of skill and unfitness of the attorney may be imputed to the defendant who
employed him, the acts of the attorney thus becoming those of his client unless they
are rejected and such a fact is made known to the court." Id. at 157. This inconsistency
is reflected in the fact that one commentator soon thereafter cited Rice v. Davis for
the proposition that the status of counsel is immaterial. See Waltz, supra note 3, at
300 n.72, while subsequent cases reaffirmed or perhaps reestablished the agency
theory. See King v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
924 (1967) (an accused cannot complain when the court did not appoint his counsel);
Whack v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1965). That the current position of the
Court remains ambiguous is evidenced by its recent statement that a defendant is
"chargeable with error of judgment on the part of his retained counsel, unless it
appears that the efforts of his retained counsel were such as to shock the conscience of
the court or to render the proceedings a farce and a mockery of justice." Lay v.
Commonwealth, 506 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Ky. 1974).
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Rice v. Davis is one of the very few cases in which the
Kentucky Court of Appeals has found a denial of the right to
effective assistance of counsel. Significantly, an analysis of the
circumstances before the Court indicates that it had little or
no other choice. In the first place, the Court was unable to find
that the trial record revealed no malfeasance, for the absence
of the trial record was itself the product of the negligence of the
attorney and the lower court. Secondly, the Court could not
rely on the agency theory because one exception to this doctrine
is that the attorney's negligence is not to be imputed to the
defendant if the defendant made his objection known to the
court. Finally, the state action theory could not be applied
because it was the alleged refusal of the court to comply with
the defendant's request for a court reporter which resulted in
the absence of a trial record. Thus it appears that the Court
had no alternative but to order a new trial.
The farce and mockery standard adopted in Rice has since
been called upon in numerous instances to do battle with the
post-trial allegations of convicted defendants. In King v.
Commonwealth, 5 the Court found that the refusal of defense
counsel to plead self-defense was not shocking, and that the
proceedings were not rendered a mockery. In Ramsey v.
Commonwealth,"6 the Court said that effective counsel does
not guarantee "error-free representation," but does guarantee
that there shall be no "mockery of justice." Similarly, the
Court in Penn v. Commonwealth77 held: "This court meant
what it said in Rice v. Davis that counsel's representation must
be 'so lacking in competence that it becomes the duty of the
court to observe such a condition and correct it .... 11118
A discussion of Kentucky's approach to the issue of effec-
tive counsel would not be complete without some mention of
the burden of proof imposed on the defendant, and certain
extrinsic factors which occasionally result in a finding of inef-
fective counsel. Regarding the burden of proof, the Court has
held that there is a presumption of competence on the part of
- 408 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 924 (1967).
- 399 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Ky.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 865 (1966).
" 427 S.W.2d 808 (Ky. 1968).
1s Id. at 809 (citations omitted).
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appointed defense counsel. In Copeland v. Commonwealth 9
the Court remarked, rather optimistically, that "when the
court in good faith appoints a member of the bar in good stand-
ing to represent the defendant, the presumption is that such
counsel is competent and diligent. Otherwise, he would not be
in good standing at the bar or appointed by the court in the
first place."" This presumption, in turn, places a heavy burden
on a convicted defendant who appeals alleging ineffective
counsel. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Campbell,8' the Court held
that the defendant must "do more than raise a doubt about the
regularity of the proceedings under which he was convicted. He
must establish convincingly that he has been deprived of some
substantial right which could justify the extraordinary relief
afforded by this postconviction proceeding."8 The Court, in
reversing the vacating of judgment by the trial judge, went on
to conclude that even though the lower court had "serious
doubt" as to the adequacy of representation, the defendant had
failed to satisfy his heavy burden.9s
To overcome the presumption of competence, the Court
has required a defendant alleging incompetent counsel to plead
with particularity. In Lawson v. Commonwealth," the Court
said: "The charge of inadequate counsel, if made with such
particularity as to suggest substance, may become a valid basis
for a hearing and relief under R. Cr. 11.42."I' To demonstrate
the degree of specificity required, the Court added: "Appellant
does not assert that counsel badgered him into entering a guilty
plea, nor does he claim that he failed to understand the conse-
quences of his guilty plea. Under these circumstances, the re-
cord shows on its face that no basis has been laid upon which
" 397 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1965).
' Id. at 61. But see Bazelon, supra note 22, at 22-23 ("I have often been told that
if my court were to reverse every case in which there was inadequate counsel, we would
have to send back half the convictions in my jurisdiction.").
81 415 S.W.2d 614 (Ky. 1967).
U Id. at 616.
8 Id.
- 386 S.W.2d 734 (Ky. 1965).
uId. at 735. Ky. R. CrM. P. 11.42(1) provides: "A prisoner in custody under
sentence who claims a right to be released on the ground that the sentence is subject
to collateral attack may at any time proceed directly by motion in the court which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct it."
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to support the claim of inadequate counsel. 86
Aside from defense attorney's intrinsic incompetence, cer-
tain extrinsic circumstances often produce claims of a sixth
amendment violation. Two such claims are that defense coun-
sel lacked adequate time to prepare for the trial,87 and that
defense counsel had a conflict of interest which impaired his
ability to effectively represent his client." In Kentucky, either
claim may result in a reversal on the ground of ineffective
counsel,89 but neither provides a convicted defendant with
guaranteed relief.
Concerning time for preparation, the Court has held that
a failure by defense counsel to request a continuance "would
not of itself support a motion to set aside the conviction on the
ground of ineffective assistance of counsel."9 This position has
produced some interesting results. In Uwaniwich v.
Commonwealth," the Court found no reversible error even
though the defendant was indicted, arraigned, tried and con-
victed all in the same day. The Court observed: "That the
whole thing was done in one day does not necessarily damn it.
The administration of justice is supposed to be prompt. More
often than not it is criticized because it is not prompt
11 386 S.W.2d at 735. See Mullins v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1970);
Wahl v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 774 (Ky. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 976 (1966).
1 See generally Finer, supra note 3, at 1089-92; Comment, Right to Effective
Counsel; Constitutional Rights Violated by Denial of Continuance, 19 KA. L. REV.
622 (1971); Comment, 14 S.D.L. Rav., supra note 4, at 294-96.
Is See generally Finer, supra note 3, at 1108-09; Comment, 14 S.D.L. REV., supra
note 4, at 296-97; Note, 18 VAND. L. Rv., supra note 3, at 1926.
11 For reversals resulting from lack of time to prepare because the trial court
refused to grant a continuance, see, e.g., Roberts v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.2d 640
(Ky. 1960). "[The right to counsel 'means counsel with reasonable opportunity to
prepare the case.'" Id. at 643 (footnote omitted); Johnston v. Commonwealth, 124
S.W.2d 1035 (Ky. 1939). For conflict of interest claims, see Maynard v. Common-
wealth, 507 S.W.2d 143 (1974); Maye v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 731 (Ky. 1965).
When one attorney represents co-defendants, "there is always a possibility, and
usually a probability, of conflicting interests between the two, and only separate coun-
sel can protect each from possible advantage by the other." Id. at 733 (footnote omit-
ted).
go Jones v. Commonwealth, 388 S.W.2d 601 (Ky. 1965) (counsel was appointed on
the morning of the trial). See Hargrove v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1965);
Collins v. Commonwealth, 392 S.W.2d 77 (Ky.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 881 (1965)
(defendant convicted of armed robbery is not necessarily denied due process solely
because he was tried and convicted on the same day counsel was appointed).
11 390 S.W.2d 658 (Ky. 1965).
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enough.'12 Moreover, in Burton v. Commonwealth,93 the Court
found adequate representation even though the defendant was
given "30 seconds or less" before trial to consult with his court-
appointed counsel. 4 The Court remarked: "[The defendant]
does not contend this brief time was insufficient, or that he
asked for more time and was refused. His attorney could ask,
'are you guilty', and get a yes or no answer in less than three
seconds. We conclude this ground insufficient to entitle appel-
lant to a hearing."95
In the case of Vaughan v. Commonwealth,6 the Court did
find that the defendant had been denied the effective assis-
tance of counsel. There, the defendant alleged not only that his
counsel had spent a mere 15 minutes in trial preparation, but
also that his appointed counsel had an apparent conflict of
interest because he was representing a co-defendant. Recogniz-
ing both factors, the Court held: "Under the totality of the
circumstances. . . it is our opinion that Vaughan was denied
effective assistance of counsel . . . ."
The Vaughan decision is an example of a case in which
representation of a co-defendant at least contributed to a rever-
sal. However, other less apparent conflicts of interest have not
proven to be sufficient grounds for reversal. In Cole v.
Commonwealth" the Court held in a habeas corpus proceeding
that because the issue was not raised on direct appeal, the
defendant could not later allege a conflict of interest because
his appointed defense attorney was also the city prosecuting
attorney. While in Dawson v. Commonwealth," which was a
direct appeal from a conviction for attempted rape, the Court,
citing Cole, concluded that representation was adequate and
that there was no conflict of interest even though defense coun-
sel was also the local prosecutor.100
11 Id. at 659.
" 394 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1965).
"Id. at 934.
"Id. (emphasis added).
" 505 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1974).
gT Id. at 770.
" 441 S.W.2d 160 (Ky. 1969).
" 498 S.W.2d 128 (Ky. 1973).
'"Id. at 129.
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE FARCE AND MOCKERY OF JUSTICE STANDARD
The farce and mockery of justice standard reflects the re-
fusal of appellate courts to face the problem of ineffective assis-
tance of defense counsel.101 This reluctance is evidenced by the
relatively few reversals that have occurred in jurisdictions uti-
lizing the standard. Because it is strict, and met only when
there is an overwhelming case of incompetency, the farce and
mockery standard has proven vulnerable to criticism. In fact,
the Sixth Circuit concluded in Beasley that "farce and mock-
ery" was not a viable test which the court could realistically
apply on a case-by-case approach, but was instead a mere
"conclusory description" of a proceeding in which assistance of
counsel was constitutionally deficient.102 In support of the con-
tention that the farce and mockery standard is no test at all,
one commentator described it as rationalization, used to justify
the result, which provides no practical basis for considering the
constitutional issue."0 3 Whether this "test" is viewed as a con-
clusion, or as a rationale, the argument that the farce and
mockery standard does not provide the tool required to pro-
perly measure the performance of defense counsel is persu-
asive.
Other attacks on the farce and mockery standard have not
questioned its validity as a test, but have instead been directed
at the weaknesses apparent in its application. One criticism is
that the vagueness of the standard renders it vulnerable to
different interpretations,104 thus causing it to be unwieldly in
its application and unpredictable in its consequences.1 5 This
lack of objectivity makes it "readily apparent that . . . the
courts have not fashioned a test which is capable of precise
application in future situations, since [the] terms are highly
subjective."'08
A second criticism of the test is that it is not adequate to
protect the constitutional rights of the accused. Involved in the
question of ineffective counsel are both the sixth amendment
"I Bazelon, supra note 22, at 28.
102 Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974).
" Comment, 25 BAYLOR L. REv., supra note 31, at 300.
,00 Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 692 (6th Cir. 1974).
'" Finer, supra note 3, at 1078.
,01 Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1390, 1397 (1960).
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right to counsel, as expanded by Powell v. Alabama,0 7 and the
fifth amendment right to a fair trial under the due process
clause. Although these two rights are interrelated, it has been
argued that the standard "farce and mockery" is inadequate to
provide real protection for a criminal defendant under either
one. The due process argument is that it seems, "somewhat
specious to define a 'fair trial' as one which is only little better
than a mockery and a farce. . ... "I Surely, the requirements
of due process are not satisfied if a defendant is convicted in a
trial in which his attorney, although performing unsatisfacto-
rily, was not so bad as to render the trial a farce and a mockery
of justice, and not so appalling as to shock the conscience of
the court.
Rights under the sixth amendment focus more on the per-
formance of the defense attorney than on the fairness of the
trial. A standard that finds an attorney's performance to be not
"ineffective" because it stopped just short of rendering the trial
a farce and a mockery is detrimental not only to the victimized
defendant, but to the legal profession as well. The contention
here is that the standard "requires such a minimal level of
performance from counsel that it is itself a mockery of the sixth
amendment.""'
A final criticism of the standard is that it is not easily
adaptable to the myriad of situations that can confront the
court. For example, in Wedding v. Commonwealth,"10 the Ken-
tucky Court had before it a case in which the entire Harrison
County Bar, "except one elderly gentlemen and the public
prosecutors," was appointed to represent the defendant."' A
respected attorney conducted the actual trial, but admitted on
appeal that "none of the attorneys ever interrogated any of the
prospective Commonwealth witnesses and each proceeded on
the ancient adage that 'everybody's business is nobody's busi-
ness,' and that . . . no single or united effort was made to
prepare the defendant's defense .... 112 Faced with this ad-
1- 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
C' omment, 25 BAYLOR L. REv., supra note 31, at 301.
" Bazelon, supra note 22, at 28.
" 394 S.W.2d 105 (Ky. 1965) (Montgomery, Palmore, Stewart, J.J., dissenting).
"I Id.
112 Id. at 106.
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mission, the Court was nevertheless unwilling to find that the
defendant's representation had rendered the proceeding a farce
and a mockery of justice. The Court was likewise unwilling to
ignore the fact that the defense attorney had admitted that the
defendant had been denied effective counsel. Confronted with
this dilemma, the majority simply reversed the conviction,
concluding that the defendant had been denied effective assis-
tance of counsel."' In so holding, the Court made no mention
of the Rice standard. The dissenters, however, contended that
the farce and mockery test was applicable, and that under that
test there had been no denial of effective counsel. Justice Stew-
art, joined in his dissent by Justices Montgomery and Palmore,
wrote: "A hindsight attack on what were obviously deliberate
trial tactics (and tactics, we might add, which leave no room
for criticism, even at this late date) falls far short of demon-
strating ineffective assistance of counsel." ' After restating the
farce and mockery standard contained in Rice v. Davis, he
concluded: "I submit that appellant's trial which resulted in
his conviction should be upheld when this test is applied to all
the surrounding facts."'15
VI. AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE
FARCE AND MOCKERY STANDARD
Should the farce and mockery test be found inadequate,
there are several available alternatives currently in use by
other courts. The Third Circuit, in United States v. Hines,"'
utilized a standard which is comparable to the now discarded
tort standard for medical malpractice;1 1 7 that is, counsel is ade-
quate if he exercises "the customary skill and knowledge which
normally prevails at that time and place.""" In West Virginia
"I Id. For a similar case where representation was found to be adequate, see Call
v. Commonwealth, 482 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1972), modified, 492 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1973)
(modified as to sentence imposed).
"1 394 S.W.2d at 109.
115 Id.
III 470 F.2d 225 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968 (1973).
117 See W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 164 (4th ed. 1971).
1,8 470 F.2d at 231. For an analysis of this standard, and the contention that
convictions be vacated under it only when the ineffective counsel clouded the issue of
guilt or when the actions become so bad as to require intervention by the trial judge
to protect the trial process, see Bines, supra note 22.
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the test is whether counsel demonstrated the skill of an attor-
ney "reasonably knowledgeable of criminal law,""' 9 while the
Fourth Circuit has opted for objectivity with a specific set of
criteria with which an attorney must comply in order to satisfy
his constitutional duties.' 21
The standard adopted in the Fifth Circuit is "... counsel
reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective
assistance."'' This test, without more, begs the issue by incor-
porating the term to be defined-"effective.' '12 2 It is similar in
this respect to the test of the District of Columbia Circuit,
which inquires "whether gross incompetence blotted out the
essence of a substantial defense."' Clearly, "gross incompe-
tence" is no more objectively definable than "effective."'2 4
With regard to both of these standards it has been said that
their "vagueness and cryptic application rob [them] of any
prophylactic effect."'2
These various alternatives provide a mixture of standards
ranging from the most general to the most specific. Perhaps the
ideal test would provide both the flexibility required for a last-
ing constitutional standard and the objectivity necessary to
provide pertinent guidelines to both courts and defense attor-
neys. The test most nearly meeting these goals is the Beasley
standard adopted by the Sixth Circuit. The general standard
adopted in Beasley is that counsel must be reasonably likely
' State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445, 461 (W. Va. 1974).
Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224,226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
Standards include: (1) counsel must confer with his client early, and as often as
necessary; (2) counsel must advise him of his rights; (3) counsel must ascertain and
develop all appropriate defenses; (4) counsel must conduct all necessary investiga-
tions; and (5) counsel must allow time before trial for preparation and reflection. Judge
Bazelon writes of this standard:
The inflexibility of a minimal list of specific duties may serve only to create
more elaborate rituals to satisfy sixth amendment requirements. There is a
danger that these concretized standards will be seen as a ceiling as well as a
floor. But this standard does have its virtues: its approach to the problem of
"prejudice", its focus on a lawyer's performance rather than on his ability
and its embryonic attempt to establish clear guidelines for courts and coun-
sel in future cases.
Bazelon, supra note 22, at 33.
121 MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960).
"2 Finer, supra note 3, at 1078-79.
"' Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
'" See Bazelon, supra note 22, at 29; Finer, supra note 3, at 1078.
" Bazelon, supra note 22, at 29.
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
to render and must actually render reasonably effective assis-
tance. This portion of the standard is identical to that of the
Fifth Circuit and is thus subject to the same criticism that it
contains the term sought to be defined. However, this defect is
cured by the addition of objective guidelines for performance.
In requiring a performance equal to that of an attorney "with
ordinary training and skill in the criminal law,"' the court has
provided a handle for the elusive constitutional standard of
effective counsel.
In an effort to establish further objectivity, however, the
court has perhaps created some ambiguity between the per-
formance standard of "ordinary training and skill in the crimi-
nal law," and its method for applying the standard, i.e., assis-
tance is not constitutionally defective if it would appear sound
in hindsight to a "competent criminal attorney."'" It is con-
ceivable that an act done in good faith and conscience by an
attorney with "ordinary training and skill in the criminal law"
would not appear "sound" to an attorney "competent" in the
field. The two can be reconciled, however, if it is agreed that
an attorney possessed of ordinary training and skill is thereby
rendered competent in criminal law. Nevertheless, to be more
consistent, the court might better have stated that a defense
attorney's behavior would not be deemed constitutionally
defective so long as "reasonably competent and fairly experi-
enced criminal defense lawyers might debate its propriety."'2
This approach would better equate the standard with its
method of application.
VII. CONCLUSION
Even though the farce and mockery standard retained by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals is still utilized by many appel-
late courts, the Court should perhaps reconsider this standard
in light of the new standard adopted by the Sixth Circuit in
Beasley, and the subsequent criticism of the farce and mockery
1 491 F.2d at 696.
'12 Id. (emphasis added). This approach reflects the concern of one commentator
that "ordinary skill and care," in order to protect the defendant, "must be the skill
and care of a competent criminal attorney." Bines, supra note 22, at 939.
'11 Finer, supra note 3, at 1080.
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test in Berry v. Cowan.29 Certainly, a lowering of the standard
to one of "reasonableness" runs the risk of increasing the num-
ber of appeals and other post-conviction proceedings; but this
risk should be balanced against the benefits to be derived.
Most importantly, a liberalizing would provide substance to
the heretofore hollow constitutional right of effective assistance
of counsel. In addition, decisions under a more liberal standard
would furnish better guidelines of courtroom conduct for de-
fense attorneys, as well as needed discipline for those attorneys
whose reputation and pride would be injured by a reversal
produced by their ineffectiveness. In the long run, hopefully,
the combination of objective guidelines and examples of inef-
fective counsel provided by reversals would improve the per-
formance of defense attorneys to the point where reversals
under the more liberal standard would be just as infrequent as
are reversals under the current farce and mockery standard. In
any event, it is suggested "that the constitutional mandate is
for fair trials through effective representation, and not merely
for proceedings which are something short of a travesty or
mockery of justice. . . ."I" The Court should consider adopt-
ing a standard better designed to effectively implement this
mandate.
Bruce F. Clark
1- 497 F.2d 1274 (6th Cir. 1974).
11 Waltz, supra note 3, at 342.
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